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Unlawful Detainer Statute (2005)
Pertinent Provisions

UTAH CODE
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 36. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
§ 78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than life
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer:
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, after
the expiration of the specified term or period for which it is let to him, which specified term or period,
whether established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, shall be terminated
without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with monthly or other periodic rent
reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the end of any month or period, in
cases where the owner, his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or
more prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring him to quit the premises at
the expiration of that month or period; or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of the premises after the expiration
of a notice of not less than five days;
(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after default in the payment of any rent
and after a notice in writing requiring in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the
detained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days after service, which notice
may be served at any time after the rent becomes due;
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, or commits
or permits waste on the premises, or when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the
premises, or when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any nuisance, including
nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9, and remains in possession after service upon him of a three
days' notice to quit; or
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform
any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under which the property is held, other than those
previously mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the performance of the
conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property, served upon him and upon any subtenant in
actual occupation of the premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within three
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days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, any
mortgagee of the term, or other person interested in its continuance may perform the condition or
covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the covenants and conditions of the
lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be performed, then no notice need be given.
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined under Title 57, Chapter 16,
Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsection 78-36-3 (l)(d) are not applicable to nuisance
actions provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78- 38-16 only.
Laws 1951, c. 58, § l;Laws 1981, c. 160, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 137, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 101, § l;Laws
1992, c. 141, §2.
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§ 78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant
(1) No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there is one in the actual
occupation of the premises when the action is commenced, shall be made a party defendant in the
proceeding, except as provided in Section 78-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be
nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might have been made a party defendant; but when it
appears that any of the parties served with process or appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment
shall be rendered against those parties.
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the premises in controversy after the service of any notice as
provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice was not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the
action. All persons who enter under the tenant after the commencement of the action shall be bound by
the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the action.
(3) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a necessary party defendant only in an abatement by
eviction action for an unlawful drug house as provided in Section 78-38-13.
Laws 1951, c. 58, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 141, §4.
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§ 78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff—Alternative remedies
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint and the entry of final judgment, the plaintiff may
execute and file a possession bond. The bond may be in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond,
certified funds, or a property bond executed by two persons who own real property in the state and who
are not parties to the action. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that is the probable amount
of costs of suit and damages which may result to the defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted.
The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court for the benefit of the defendant for all costs and
damages actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall notify the defendant that he has filed
a possession bond. This notice shall be served in the same manner as service of summons and shall
inform the defendant of all of the alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2).
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures applicable to an action if the plaintiff files a
possession bond under Subsection (1):
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon nonpayment of rent or utilities, the
existing contract shall remain in force and the complaint shall be dismissed if the defendant, within
three days of the service of the notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent, utility charges, any
late fee, and other costs, including attorney's fees, as provided in the rental agreement.
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if he executes and files a counter bond in the form of a
corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property bond executed by two persons who own
real property in the state and who are not parties to the action. The form of the bond is at the
defendant's option. The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file the
bond prior to the expiration of three days from the date he is served with notice of the filing of
plaintiffs possession bond. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that is the probable amount
of costs of suit and actual damages that may result to the plaintiff if the defendant has improperly
withheld possession. The court shall consider prepaid rent to the owner as a portion of the defendant's
total bond.
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be granted a hearing to be held prior to the expiration of three
days from the date the defendant is served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond.
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with a remedy under Subsection (2) within the required
time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be granted an order of restitution. The constable of the
precinct or the sheriff of the county where the property is situated shall return possession of the property
to the plaintiff promptly.
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Subsection (2)(c), and if the court rules after the hearing
that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property, the constable or sheriff shall promptly return
possession of the property to the plaintiff. If at the hearing the court allows the defendant to remain in
possession and further issues remain to be adjudicated between the parties, the court shall require the
defendant to post a bond as required in Subsection (2)(b). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues

between the parties can be adjudicated without further court proceedings, the court shall, upon
adjudicating those issues, enter judgment on the merits.
Laws 1981, c. 160, § 4; Laws 1983, c. 209, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 123, § 3.
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§ 78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent—Immediate enforcement—Treble
damages
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the
plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of the premises as provided in Section 78-36-10.5. If
the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of
the lease or agreement under which the property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the
judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and
proved at trial;
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the payment of rent; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 78-38- 9 through 78-38-16.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the
damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c), and for reasonable attorneys' fees, if they are
provided for in the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of the rent, execution upon the
judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may be
issued and enforced immediately.
Laws 1951, c. 58, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 160, § 5; Laws 1987, c. 123, § 4; Laws 1992, c. 141, § 5; Laws
1994, c. 225, §2.
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§ 78-36-123. Definitions
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant from entering into the premises with intent to
deprive the tenant of such entry.
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the same meaning as landlord
under common law and the statutes of this state.
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations:
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent from the premises, and the
tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence other than
the presence of the tenant's personal property that the tenant is occupying the premises; or
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent from the premises, and the
tenant fails to pay rent when due and the tenant's personal property has been removed from the
dwelling unit and there is no reasonable evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises.
Laws 1981, c. 160, § 7. Current through end of 2005 First Special Session
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Unlawful Detainer Statute (2007)
Pertinent Provisions
UTAH CODE
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 36. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
§ 78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant
(1) No person other than the tenant of the premises, a lease signer, and subtenant if there is one in the
actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced, shall be made a party defendant in the
proceeding, except as provided in Section 78-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be
nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might have been made a party defendant; but when it
appears that any of the parties served with process or appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment
shall be rendered against those parties.
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the premises in controversy after the service of any notice as
provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice was not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the
action. All persons who enter under the tenant after the commencement of the action shall be bound by
the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the action.
(3) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a necessary party defendant only in an abatement by
eviction action for an unlawful drug house as provided in Section 78-38-13.
Laws 1951, c. 58, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 141, $4: Laws 2007, c. 360, $ 2, eff. April 30, 2007.
Codifications C. 1943, Supp., § 104-36-7.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2007, c. 360, in subsec. (1) inserted "a lease signer,"
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§ 78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent—Immediate enforcement—Treble
damages
(l)(a) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default.
(b) A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of the premises
as provided in Section 78-36-10.5.
(c) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to perform any condition or
covenant of the lease or agreement under which the property is held, or after default in the payment of
rent, the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
(d)(i) A forfeiture under Subsection (l)(c) does not release a defendant from any obligation for
payments on a lease for the remainder of the lease's term.
(ii) Subsection (l)(d)(i) does not change any obligation on either party to mitigate damages.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and
proved at trial;
(d) the amounts due under the contract, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the payment
of amounts due under the contract; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 78-38- 9 through 78-38-16.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the
damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(e), and for reasonable attorney fees.
(4)(a) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer, execution upon the judgment shall be issued
immediately after the entry of the judgment.
(b) In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately.
Laws 1951, c. 58, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 160, § 5; Laws 1987, c. 123, § 4; Laws 1992, c. 141, § 5; Laws
1994, c. 225, § 2; Laws 2007, c. 360, § 6, eff. April 30, 2007.
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Codifications C. 1943, Supp., § 104-36-10.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2007, c. 360, inserted subsec. designators (l)(a) through (c) and inserted subsec. (l)(d); rewrote
subsec. (2)(d) which read: "the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in
the payment of rent; and"; in subsec. (3) substituted "(2)(e)" for "(2)(c) "attorney" for "attorney's" and
at the end deleted ", if they are provided for in the lease or agreement"; inserted subsec. designators
(4)(a) and (b) and in subsec. (4)(a) following "unlawful detainer" deleted "after default in the payment of
the rent".
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UTAH CODE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS
RULE 7. PLEADINGS ALLOWED; MOTIONS, MEMORANDA, HEARINGS, ORDERS,
OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S ORDER
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim; an answer to
a cross claim, if the answer contains a cross claim; a third party complaint, if a person who was
not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third party answer, if a
third party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may
order a reply to an answer or a third party answer.
(b)(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made
during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court commissioner, shall be made in
accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing and state succinctly and with particularity
the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought.
(b)(2) Limit on order to show cause. An application to the court for an order to show cause shall
be made only for enforcement of an existing order or for sanctions for violating an existing
order. An application for an order to show cause must be supported by an affidavit sufficient to
show cause to believe a party has violated a court order.
(c) Memoranda.
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except uncontested or ex parte
motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum. Within ten days after service of
the motion and supporting memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum
in opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition, the moving party
may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the
memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A
party may attach a proposed order to its initial memorandum.
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument without leave of the
court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of argument without leave of the court. The
court may permit a party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and a
showing of good cause.
(c)(3) Content.
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a statement
of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact shall
be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials, such as
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affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding
party.
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a verbatim
restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may contain a separate
statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted,
the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts
set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and
supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a table of contents
and a table of authorities with page references.
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of documents cited
in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a "Request
to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision shall state the date on which the
motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply
memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a
request, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may request a hearing in the
motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit for decision. A request for hearing shall be
separately identified in the caption of the document containing the request. The court shall grant
a request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action or
any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or opposition to the
motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided.
(f) Orders.
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order entered in writing,
not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of money may be enforced in the same
manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made
without notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the
court's initiative.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or
unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the
court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's
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decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party
preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or upon
expiration of the time to object.
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as separate documents
and shall not incorporate any matter by reference.
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of a court
commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A party may object to the
recommendation by filing an objection in the same manner as filing a motion within ten days
after the recommendation is made in open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter
under advisement, ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may
respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion.
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008
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RULE 8. GENERAL RULES OF PLEADINGS
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief
to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be
demanded.
(b) Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each
claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies. If he is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he
shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the
averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of
an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the
remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith t6 controvert all the averments of the
preceding pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or
paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all its averments, he
may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality,
injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute
of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.
When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a
defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a
proper designation.
(d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the
responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or
permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of
pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two or
more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be
sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
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alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has
regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All
statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008
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RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant
shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is
complete within the state and within thirty days after service of the summons and complaint is
complete outside the state. A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an
answer thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a
counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered
by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The
service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time
is fixed by order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading
does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be
served within ten days after the service of the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join
an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if
a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or
more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after
the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense
numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a
motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time
as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided
in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
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(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of
this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in
subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party,
unless the court orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a
responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a
responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details
desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after
notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no
responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty days
after the service of the pleading, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the
other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under this rule
and does not include therein all defenses and objections then available which this rule permits to
be raised by motion, the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by
motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of
failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2)
that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if
made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that
may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any
motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of
this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to
furnish security for costs and charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon
hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order
the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such
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costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of any
officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered
within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an
order dismissing the action.
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008
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RULE 19. JOINDER OF PERSONS NEEDED FOR JUST ADJUDICATION
(a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall be joined
as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of
his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If
he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper
case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render
the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described in
Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity
and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be
dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered
by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be
prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions
in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth,
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state the
names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who
are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23.
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008
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RULE 20. PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES
(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to
relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to
all of them will arise in the action. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there
is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant
need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may
be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against
one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities.
(b) Separate Trials. The court may make such orders as will prevent a party from being
embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a party against whom he asserts no
claim and who asserts no claim against him, and may order separate trials or make other orders
to prevent delay or prejudice.
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008
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RULE 54. JUDGMENTS; COSTS
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from
which an appeal lies A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master,
or the record of prior proceedings Judgments shall state whether they are entered upon trial,
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative, and, unless otherwise directed by the court, a
judgment shall not include any matter by reference
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for
the entry of judgment In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties
(c) Demand for judgment.
(c)(1) Generally Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if
the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings It may be given for or against one or
more of several claimants, and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves
(c)(2) Judgment by default A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed
in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment
(d) Costs.
(d)( 1) To whom awarded Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of
this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the
court otherwise directs, provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause Costs against the state of Utah, its
officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law
(d)(2) How assessed The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of
judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with
the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items
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are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of
the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the
service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of
judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment
signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs,
if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have
been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the amount
thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the
register of actions and in the judgment docket.
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008
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RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted
or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or
any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered
on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered
upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of
the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel,
shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in
the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a
response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing
the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify
the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
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continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had
or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party
presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing
of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney
may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008
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UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS
RULE 24. BRIEFS
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings
and in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or
order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the
names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears
immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules,
statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of
appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation
is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim
with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone
will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11)
of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the
course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to
the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e)
of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a
succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a
mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged.
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(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the
request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(a)(l 1) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief
unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of
contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(a)(l 1)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in
the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(l 1)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in all
cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part
of a regularly published reporter service; and
(a)(l 1)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination
of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law,
memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the contract or document
subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement
of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant.
The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant
to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new
matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the
requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed
except with leave of the appellate court.
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(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments
to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It
promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or
the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured person,1
"the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original
record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of
published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of
each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered
page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to
exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility
of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the
evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50
pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions
of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals,
paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court
otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages,
and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages.
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the
appeal.
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in
the cross-appeal.
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of
Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of CrossAppellant.
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the Brief
of Cross-Appellee.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good
cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this
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rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the number of additional
pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days
before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be
accompanied by a copy of the brief A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief
is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief
for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal
number of additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or
denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one
appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of
either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part
of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the
attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the
citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall state
the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 words.
Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the
offending lawyer.
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)

RAY HUNTING,

)

JUDGMENT AND FINAL ORDER

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)

PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, LLC, a
Limited Liability Company

)
)

Defendant.

)

)

)

Case No. 050800484
Judge John R. Anderson

)

On November 1, 2006, this Court entered its Ruling and Order partially granting
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment because: (1) the parties did not have a written lease
agreement; (2) the Plaintiff was entitled to unilaterally increase the Defendant's monthly rent
from $2,000.00 per month to $7,500.00 per month as part of the resulting month-to-month
tenancy; (3) the Defendant had received notice and was aware of the foregoing rent increase; (4)
the Defendant was served with and received a notice to pay or vacate on September 16, 2005; (5)
the Defendant did not thereafter pay the increased amount of rent or vacate but continued paying
only $2,000.00 per month; and (6) by not paying the increased monthly rent or vacating the

premises, Defendant was in unlawful detainer of the property. The Court also denied the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss but reserved the issue of Plaintiff s damages for a future hearing.
After the Court's November 1, 2006, Ruling and Order, Defendant filed a Motion to
Reconsider the Court's November lsl Ruling and Order. After receipt of briefing from the
parties' counsel, the Court scheduled and entertained oral argument regarding Defendant's
Motion to Reconsider on January 30, 2007. At the conclusion of oral argument, the Court issued
its ruling from the bench and denied the Defendant's Motion to Reconsider. The Court also reaffirmed the partial summary judgment it had granted in Plaintiffs favor in the Court's
November 1, 2006, Ruling and Order on the basis that Defendant was in unlawful detainer. On
February 1, 2007, the Court issued its written Ruling and Order in which it formally denied
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and formally affirmed the Court's partial summary judgment
in Plaintiffs favor as determined in the November 1, 2006, Ruling and Order.
On April 6, 2007, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of
Damages with the same accompanied by a Supporting Memorandum. After receiving briefing
from both parties' counsel, the Coun issued its Ruling dated May 31, 2007, denying Defendants
Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety.
On May 3, 2007, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Award Damages and for Entry of Final
Judgment, which was accompanied by a supporting memorandum, the affidavit of Plaintiff s
expert witness, Paul Throndsen, MAI, and the affidavits of Plaintiff, Ray Hunting and his cocounsel, Phillip W. Dyer. In response to Plaintiffs Motion, Defendant did not submit any expert
opinion or affidavit of any expert witness. On May 17, 2007, Defendant also filed Motions to
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Strike the Affidavits of Ray Hunting and Phillip W. Dyer. Both of the foregoing Motions were
fully briefed and appropriate Notices to Submit for Decision were filed with the Court Clerk.
After considering the parties' submissions and pleadings, the Court entered its Ruling on
July 2, 2007, granting, in part, Plaintiffs Motion to Award Damages and for Entry of Final
Judgment and granting, in part, Defendant's Motion to Strike. In the Court's Railing, the Court
ordered the Plaintiffs counsel to prepare a proposed order and final judgment consistent with the
Court's Ruling and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion to Award Damages is granted, in part, and Plaintiff is hereby

awarded a judgment against Defendant in the total sum of $88,174.50, which is calculated as
follows:
A. Unpaid rent from September of 2005 through December of 2006 in the
amount of $88,000.00.
B. Treble damages - $0.00.
C. Costs in the amount of $ 174.50.
Interest shall accrue on foregoing judgment at the current judgment rate of 6.99 % per
annum until such time as the judgment and accrued interest is/are paid in full.
2.

The Defendant's Motion to Strike is granted, in part, as follows:
A.
The Court hereby strikes the following paragraphs in the May 2, 2007,
Affidavit of Ray Hunting: 1) paragraph four in its entirety; and 2)
paragraph five in its entirety.
B.

The Court hereby strikes the following paragraphs in the May 2, 2007,
Affidavit of Phillip W. Dyer: 1) paragraphs three in its entirety; 2)
paragraph four in its entirety; and 3) the final sentence of paragraph six.
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The remainder of Defendant's Motion to Strike is denied.
3.

Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Judgment on Order Regarding Attorney's Fees

Awarded Pursuant to Court Ruling and Order dated October 17, 2006, is rendered moot by the
Satisfaction of Judgment Regarding Attorney's Fees filed with the Court on June 18, 2007.
4.

Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Final Judgment is hereby granted and this Order

shall constitute the final, appealable judgment/order in this matter. Any Motion not heretofore
explicitly granted or denied is hereby denied.
DATED this

UP

*E£ JOHNHR. ANDERSON
Eighth District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

JuJL 31, 2cx>l
Daniel S. Sam, Esq.
Williaim L. Reynolds, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendant
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Exhibit E

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT \
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

%

/ fj> ><$>
^>

RAY HUNTING,
RULING
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 050800484
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

vs,
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, L.L.C.,
Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on the following motions:
1) Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment on Order Regarding
Attorney's Fees Awarded Pursuant to Court Ruling and Order Dated
October 17, 2006, filed May 03, 2007; 2} Plaintiff's Motion to
Award Damages and for Entry of Final Judgment, filed May 03,
2007; 3) Defendant's Motion to Strike Hunting Affidavit, filed
May 17, 2007; 4) Defendant's Motion to Strike Dyer Affidavit,
filed May 17, 2007.
I. Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment on Order Regarding
Attorney's Fees Awarded Pursuant to Court Ruling and Order Dated
October 17, 2006
It appears to the Court, from a review of the record, that
the October 17, 2006 order of the Court awarding the Plaintiff
$1,000.00 as attorney fees has already been observed. On June
18, 2007, the Defendant filed a Satisfaction of Judgment Regarding Attorney Fees which states that the $1,000.00 award has been
"fully paid, satisfied and discharged by check number 5152."
Therefore, the Plaintiff's motion on this issue is now mooted.
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II. Plaintiff's Motion to Award Damages and for Entry of Final
Judgment
The Plaintiff's motion requests an order awarding the
Plaintiff the following:
a) $88,000.00 for unpaid rent from September 2005 through
December 2006;
b) $264,000.00 as treble damages based upon Defendant's unlawful detainer of the subject property;
c) $174.50 for costs and court fees; and
d) final judgment based upon the aforementioned amounts.
Based upon the prior rulings of the Court, it is clear that
the Plaintiff is entitled to the $88,000.00 for unpaid rent.
The Court has previously found that: 1) these parties did not
have a written lease; 2) that the Plaintiff was entitled to unilaterally increase the Defendant's rent as part of the resulting
month-to-month tenancy; 3) that the Defendant was aware of the
rent increase; 4) that the Defendant received a notice to pay or
vacate; 5) that the Defendant did not pay the increased amount
of rent, but continued paying only $2,000.00 per month; and 6)
that by not paying the increased amount and not vacating the Defendant was in unlawful detainer of the property. The increased
rent amount went into effect in September 2005. It appears that
the Defendant has vacated the property as of December 2006. As
a result, the Defendant failed to pay the increased amount of
rent for 16 months. Sixteen (16) months at $5,500.00 per month
(the difference between what the Plaintiff expected, $7,500.00
per month, and what the Defendant actually paid, $2,000.00 per
month) results in $88,000.00 of unpaid rent. Therefore, based
upon the foregoing, the Court hereby awards the Plaintiff
$88,000.00 for unpaid rent.
The more difficult question is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the requested $264,000.00 as treble damages for the
Defendant's unlawful detainer. First, there is no question that
even if the Defendant had vacated the premises after receiving
the Plaintiff's three-day notice to pay or vacate (or any time

thereafter, for that matter), this Court would not have been in
a position to restore possession of the subject property to the
Plaintiff. The fact of the matter is that another party, PRS,
Inc.,1 was still arguably in possession of the premises or had
legal right to the premises based upon a lease between the Corporation and the Plaintiff. The rights and obligations of the
parties to that lease agreement have never been brought before
this Court for adjudication and the Court currently lacks jurisdiction to render a decision on those issues. It is for these
reason that the Court twice declined to issue an order of restitution or the subject property to the Plaintiff in this case,
even after the Defendant was found to be in unlawful detainer of
the subject property.
The Plaintiff urges the Court to presume that PRS, Inc. had
abandoned the lease. See Plaintiff's Reply in Supp. of Mot. to
Award Damages 6 n.10 and 7 n.15. Plaintiff then states that
"Plaintiff is not asking this Court to adjudicate the rights of
PRS Corporation . . ." I_cL at 8. The Court will not presume
that PRS, Inc. abandoned the lease without having PRS, Inc. as a
party to the suit. Therefore, the presumption of abandonment
will not be entertained, or relied upon, by the Court.
Instead, the Court will hold to the position it has taken
previously in this case. Even if PRS, LLC had vacated the premises, the Plaintiff would have been unable to retake possession
of the subject property until lawfully dealing with PRS, Inc.'s
alleged rights under the lease. Because the Plaintiff would
have had no right to possession of the property, the Court cannot see how the Plaintiff was damaged beyond not receiving the
increased rental amount. On this point, the Court is persuaded
by Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952), which (contrary
to the Plaintiff's reply memorandum at 8) very clearly addresses
the issue of whether treble damages for unlawful detainer are
appropriate when a non-party to the suit enjoys possession of
the subject property. While the cases are distinguishable on
some factual points, the fact of the matter remains that

1

The Court is aware that PRS, Inc.'s name has subsequently changed, but will
continue to refer to the corporation which was party to the lease as PRS,
Inc., as stated in the lease.

C?.-)/i

so long as [PRS, Inc.] remained in possession, it is difficult to see how [Mr. Hunting] could be damaged by that fact
that [PRS, LLC] remained there. Even if [the LLC] had
moved, [Mr. Hunting] would have had no right to possession
of the premises as against [the Corporation]. [Mr. Hunting], therefore, suffered no actual damage.
See jLd. at 449. Therefore, on this basis, the Court hereby denies Plaintiff's request for any treble damages in this matter.
On this issue of costs and court fees, the Court will award
$174.50 to the Plaintiff as the prevailing party.
III. Defendant's Motions to Strike
A. The May 02, 2007 Hunting Affidavit
The Court has reviewed the Defendant's motion as it relates
to the May 02, 2007 Hunting affidavit and will grant the motion
as follows. The Court hereby strikes: 1) paragraphs four in its
entirety; and 2) paragraph five in its entirety. The Court
strikes these provisions on the ground that they contain legal
argument or opinion which exceeds the permissible scope of an
affidavit. If the Plaintiff believes there are facts contained
within those paragraphs which should be brought before the
Court, Plaintiff is instructed to submit a new affidavit limited
only to facts, and not containing conclusion, argument, or opinion.
B. The May 02, 2007 Dyer Affidavit
The Court has reviewed the Defendant's motion as it relates
to the May 02, 2007 Dyer affidavit and will grant the motion as
follows. The Court hereby strikes: 1) paragraphs three in its
entirety; 2) paragraph four in its entirety; and 3) the final
sentence of paragraph six. If the Plaintiff feels there are
facts contained within those paragraphs which should be brought
before the Court, Plaintiff is instructed to submit a new affidavit limited to facts, and not containing conclusion, argument,
or opinion.

ORDER
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby orders that:
1) Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on Attorney Fees is MOOT;
2) Plaintiff's Motion for Award of Damages is GRANTED IN PART,
as follows:
a) the Plaintiff is awarded $88,000.00 as unpaid rent;
b) the Plaintiff is awarded $0.00 as treble damages; and
c) the Plaintiff is awarded $174.50 as costs; and
3) Defendant's Motions to Strike are GRANTED IN PART, as outlined in the Court's ruling.
The Court hereby orders the Plaintiff to prepare an order
of final judgment based upon this ruling and order, and to submit it to the Court for signature per the procedures outlined in
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RAY HUNTING,
RULING
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 050800484
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

vs.
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, L.L.C.,
Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment on Issue of Damages Pursuant to Rule 56
U.R.C.P. (hereinafter ''Defendant's Damages Motion"), filed April
06, 2007, and accompanied by supporting memorandum. The matter
having been fully briefed, and having received a request for decision, the Court now rules upon the motion.
First, the Court notes that the Defendant's Memorandum in
support of the Damages Motion should contain, as a motion for
summary judgment on the issue of damages, a statement of material facts, per Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Lacking a statement of facts, it is difficult for the
Court to rule that, as a matter of law, there are no genuine issues of material fact. It also makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the opposing party to raise issues of fact to
overcome the motion for summary judgment.
Here, the Court believes that there are genuine issues as
to damages. While the Court is not convinced that the Plaintiff
is entitled to the amount sought, the Court cannot conclude that
the Plaintiff has not been damaged to some extent by the Defendant in this matter.

yf.rl

/

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby denies the Defendant's motion.
Dat ed this

ty

day of

, 2007

JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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DANIEL S SAM

, 20C /
"t
/ /'

(MLL.

Deputy Court Clerk

Page 1 (last)

Exhibit G

\ ^

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH C O U N T Y , STATE OE UTAH

RAY

HUNTING,
-

RULING AND

ORDER

Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 050800484
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

vs.
PIPE R E N E W A L

SERVICE, L . L . C . ,

Defendant.

T h i s m a t t e r is b e f o r e the Court on D e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n for
r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , filed N o v e m b e r 14, 2 0 0 6 .
The m a t t e r came b e fore the Court for oral argument on the m o t i o n on J a n u a r y 3 0 ,
2007.
At that hearing the Court considered: 1) the m e r i t s of
the m o t i o n to r e c o n s i d e r ; 2) the p r o s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of the
C o u r t ' s e a r l i e r O c t o b e r 17, 2006 order regarding d i s c o v e r y ; 3)
the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of Plaintiff's attorney fees as they relate
to P l a i n t i f f ' s earlier m o t i o n to c o m p e l ; and 4) the joinder of
other i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s to this lawsuit.
At the c o n c l u s i o n of
the h e a r i n g , the Court ruled from the bench on the i s s u e s .
Having g i v e n the m a t t e r further c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the Court d e c i d e d to
issue a w r i t t e n ruling instead.
T h e r e f o r e , having reviewed the
m o t i o n and m e m o r a n d a s u b m i t t e d to the C o u r t , and having c o n s i d ered the a r g u m e n t s of the p a r t i e s as presented at the h e a r i n g ,
the Court now rules as f o l l o w s .
I. D E F E N D A N T ' S MOTION

FOR

RECONSIDERATION

T h e Court will deny the Defendant's m o t i o n for r e c o n s i d e r a tion.
A f t e r e n t e r t a i n i n g oral argument on the i s s u e , the Court
is u n c o n v i n c e d that the o r d e r granting P l a i n t i f f ' s m o t i o n for
s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t should be set a s i d e .
The C o u r t ' s p r e v i o u s r u l ing and o r d e r w i l l t h e r e f o r e stand unchanged.

That said, the Court understands that by denying the Defendant's motion for consideration, the Plaintiff will want the
Court to enter an order of restitution, restoring the subject
property to the Plaintiff. In a typical eviction case, the
proper course of action would be to issue such an order. However, in this case, there are other parties presently in possession of the subject property whose rights have not yet been adjudicated. At least one of these parties has entered into a
lease agreement with the Plaintiff. It would be wholly improper
for the Court to issue an order restoring possession to the
Plaintiff in possible contravention of rights and obligations
flowing from the lease. Therefore, the Court will deny the Defendant's motion for reconsideration, and puts the Plaintiff on
notice that the Court is unwilling at this time to issue an order of restitution.
II. PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OE OCTOBER 17, 2006 ORDER
On October 17,2006, the Court issued an order allowing additional discovery in the matter. This October 17, 2006 order
was entered prior to the Court granting Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment. At the January 30, 2007 hearing, the Plaintiff stated that if the motion for summary judgment remained undisturbed, the Plaintiff would not seek to perform the additional discovery contemplated by the October 17, 2006 order.
Because the motion for reconsideration is denied, the order
granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is undisturbed.
Therefore, the October 17, 2006 order is no longer necessary and
the Court will therefore set aside that order, to the extent
that it permits additional discovery to be conducted. This ruling also disposes of the Defendant's objections to the discovery
sought by the Plaintiff, filed September 29, 2006, and October
04, 2006.
III. REASONABLENESS OF PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY FEES
The Court awarded attorney fees to the plaintiff for having
to file a motion to compel discovery. Although the Court has
just ruled that the October 17, 2006 order has no prospective
application as far as future,discovery is concerned, the Court
will enforce the order as to the award of attorney fees. The

Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit on those fees. The Defendant objected to the reasonableness of the stated fees. Having
considered the matter, the Court will order that the amount
stated in the Plaintiff's affidavit be reduced to $1,000.00.
IV. JOINDER OF THIRD PARTIES
The Court instructed the parties to prepare to address the
issue of joining other seeming necessary parties to this lawsuit. Having review the argument of the parties and the applicable law, the Court is still not convinced that PRS, Inc. is
not a necessary party to this suit, insofar as it appears to the
Court that the Plaintiff desires to re-enter and obtain full
possession of the subject property. In granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the Court had only adjudicated the
rights between Ray Hunting and PRS, LLC. However, as stated
above, an adjudication of those rights does not allow the Court
to restore complete possession of the subject property to the
Plaintiff. It is clear to the Court that there exists a lease
between PRS, Inc. (now PRSM, Inc.) and the Plaintiff. The
rights and obligations that flow from that lease agreement have
not been adjudicated at this time. It appears that PRSM, Inc.
and PRS Holdings, Inc. have been in possession of the subject
property this entire time. Yet none of those parties have been
brought within the jurisdiction of this Court through service of
process or appearance in the matter.
The Plaintiff spent considerable time at the January 30,
2007 hearing explaining several cases, copies of which were delivered to the Court at the hearing. Having now reviewed those
cases, the Court finds that Tanner v. Lawler, 305 P.2d 882 (Utah
1957) is distinguishable from the present case on numerous
grounds, the most obvious of which is that the alleged owner of
the property (Reichert) was: 1) not in actual possession of the
property; and 2) intervened in the suit therefore submitting to
the jurisdiction of the court. Here, it appears to the Court
that PRS entities (including PRS, LLC; PRSM, Inc.; and PRS Holdings, Inc.) have all enjoyed concurrent possession of the subject property and that only PRS, LLC's rights have been adjudicated at this time, the other parties not having been joined to
the action.

^-M^r

The Court further finds that Pinckney v. Snidemanf 2000 UT
App 275, an unpublished decision, is distinguishable on the
grounds that, at the time suit was brought, Snideman was apparently in sole possession of the property in that case. Here,
there is ample reason to believe that PRS, LLC is not the sole
party in possession of the subject property. The fact that PRS,
LLC's name appears on the rent check does not, in and of itself,
make PRS, LLC the only tenant, especially in light of the lease
agreement executed between the Plaintiff and PRS, Inc., which
rights and obligations have not yet been adjudicated.
The Court also considered the case of Pearce v. Shurtz, 270
P.2d 442 (Utah 1954, and concludes that it too is distinguishable from the matter at bar. In Pearce, Call sold a ranch to
Lewellen, who subsequently assigned his interest in a bond for
deed to Shurtz, who assigned half of his interest to Wright.
Lewellen apparently maintained liability on a promissory note.
Shurtz and Wright then collectively assigned their interests to
Johnson. Then Call (the original owner) assigned his interest
in the promissory note for the ranch to Pearce, who then sued
Shurtz, Wright, and Johnson for unlawful detainer. Looking at
the matter in light of those facts, it is not difficult to see
how Pearce is distinguishable from the present action. In every
instance, there was an assignment of rights from one party to
the next. Further, the very language of the case makes it impossible for the Court to rely upon it in the way urged by the
Plaintiff. The Court stated, "Unlawful detainer, however, is an
action to remove a tenant from possession and is primarily
against the person in possession." Because Lewellen was apparently not in possession of the property, it was not required
that Lewellen be joined as a necessary party, and Pearce could
lawfully proceed against Shurtz, Wright, and Johnson (i.e., the
parties in possession). Here, as stated above, the Defendant
and the other PRS entities appear to have enjoyed concurrent
possession of the subject property.
Therefore, the Court concludes as follows. The rights of
PRS, LLC have been adjudicated, the Court finding that PRS, LLC
was lawfully served with an increase in rent. Failing to pay
the increase in rent, the Plaintiff brought suit against the LLC
for unlawful detainer. The Court's order granting Plaintiff's

motion for summary judgment effectively adjudicated the rights
of the Plaintiff against the LLC. However, the rights of the
Plaintiff against the lessee, PRS, Inc. have not been the subject of this Court's attention at t;h.is point. Therefore, it
would be improper for this Court to issue an order granting
Plaintiff the right to retake possession of the property until
such time as the rights under the lease have been adjudicated.
Finally, the issue of Plaintiff s damages resulting from
PRS, LLC's unlawful detainer will be reserved for future hearing.
ORDER
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that Defendant's motion for reconsideration is DENIED; the October 17, 2006 order has no prospective application as to future
discovery, but the Court's award of attorney fees on Plaintiff's
motion to compel survives; the Defendant is ordered to pay
$1,000.00 in attorney fees to Plaintiff; and the Court will not
enter an order of restitution of the subject property until the
rights of all tenants have been adjudicated by process of law.
Dated this

/V

day of

2007

JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RAY HUNTING,
RULING
Plaintiff,
vs.
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, L.L.C.,

CASE NO. 050800484
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendant.

T h i s m a t t e r i s b e f o r e t h e C o u r t on t h e C o u r t ' s own i n i t i a tive.
The C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s l y s e t t h i s m a t t e r f o r h e a r i n g o n :
1) D e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n t o r e c o n s i d e r and 2) t h e p r o s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e C o u r t ' s O c t o b e r 17, 2006 r u l i n g on P l a i n t i f f ' s
m o t i o n t o compel d i s c o v e r y .
T h i s h e a r i n g w i l l be h e l d on J a n u a r y 30, 2 0 0 7 , as n o t i c e d .
I . THE SECOND PROPOSED ORDER OF RESTITUTION
The C o u r t h a s r e c e i v e d a s e c o n d p r o p o s e d O r d e r of R e s t i t u t i o n , s u b m i t t e d by t h e P l a i n t i f f .
The C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s l y r e c e i v e d , e n t e r e d , and s t r u c k an O r d e r of R e s t i t u t i o n i n t h i s m a t ter.
Having r e v i e w e d t h e r e c o r d s , and a c c o r d i n g t o p l e a d i n g s
s u b m i t t e d by b o t h p a r t i e s , t h e C o u r t b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e a r e
t h i r d p a r t i e s which have n o t b e e n made p a r t of t h i s l a w s u i t , b u t
which h a v e r i g h t s r e l a t e d t o t h e u n d e r l y i n g p r o p e r t y .
In p a r t i c u l a r , t h e C o u r t i s aware t h a t t h e r e i s a l e a s e b e t w e e n t h e
P l a i n t i f f and P i p e Renewal S e r v i c e , I n c . , 1 which l e a s e was t h e
1

The C o u r t i s a w a r e t h a t t h e c u r r e n t l e g a l name of
i s P i p e Renewal S e r v i c e Management, I n c .
However,
w i l l r e f e r t o P i p e Renewal S e r v i c e Management, I n c .
I n c . a s PRS, I n c .
T h u s , when n e c e s s a r y , t h e C o u r t
d a n t a s PRS, LLC, and t o t h e l e s s e e a s PRS, I n c .

P i p e Renewal S e r v i c e , I n c .
for convenience, t h e Court
and P i p e Renewal S e r v i c e
w i l l r e f e r t o t h e Defen-

crux of the Defendant's motion to dismiss and opposition to
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. In fact, both parties,
to some extent, have relied upon the existence of PRS, Inc. in
arguing their positions. In addition, there may be other third
parties beside PRS, Inc. which have certain rights to the underlying property. Because these other third parties have not been
made party to this lawsuit, those rights have not yet been adjudicated. Therefore, the Court is reluctant to issue an order at
this time restoring possession of the subject property to the
Plaintiff.
The Court is puzzled as to why these other parties (particularly PRS, Inc.) have not been made part of this lawsuit.
It would appear that the Plaintiff is seeking to regain exclusive possession of the subject property, yet the Plaintiff has
failed to join at least one seemingly necessary party. On the
other hand, the Defendant appears to be attempting to assert the
lease rights of PRS, Inc. on behalf of the Defendant, but has
made no effort to involve PRS, Inc. in this lawsuit. PRS, Inc.
has also not attempted to intervene and assert its own rights.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in relevant portion, states
A person who is subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the
action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties . . .
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a).
Further, "If he has not been so joined,
the court shall order that he be made a party." _Id. Based upon
the foregoing, the Court is prepared to order that PRS, Inc. be
joined in this lawsuit. If there are other parties which should
also be joined as necessary parties, the Court instructs the
Plaintiff and the Defendant to bring that to the Court's attention.
Unless the parties can adequately explain why PRS, Inc.
should not be joined as a necessary party, the Court will order
that PRS, Inc. be joined per Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Because this matter has previously been set
for oral argument, the Court will forebear on issuing such an

order at this time, but hereby instructs the parties to be prepared to present the Court with argument on the issue of joining
all necessary third parties.
II. ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO OCTOBER 17, 2006 ORDER
In Plaintiff's recent memorandum in opposition to Defendant's request for clarification (filed December 26, 2006), the
Plaintiff requests that, "In the event that the Defendant decides to file a request for hearing [on the issue of attorney
fees], Plaintiff has no objection to the Court hearing the same
during oral argument . . . on January 30, 2007." Mem. in opp.,
p.3 n.5. In the interest of efficiency, the Court hereby puts
the parties on notice that, should the Defendant request a hearing on that issue, the Court will entertain argument on the same
at the January 30, 2007 hearing.
III. EVIDENTIARY HEARING FOR DAMAGES, PURSUANT TO NOVEMBER 01,
20 06 ORDER
Finally, in the event that the Court's November 01, 2007
order granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is not
set aside as a result of the January 30, 2007 hearing, an evidentiary hearing on damages will be scheduled at a future date.
Dated this

*&h

day otydUfl

Br THE

, 2007.

oG^r

(/JOHN R. ANDERSON,

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RAY HUNTING,
RULING
Plaintiff,
vs.
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, L.L.C.,

CASE NO. 050800484
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Request for
Clarification, filed December 11, 2006, and Defendant's request
for oral argument on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider, filed November 14, 2006.
The Court will grant the request for oral argument and the
matter will be set for a hearing.
Further, in light of the fact that the Court has granted
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the Court has questions
regarding the necessity of extending discovery as ordered on October 17, 2006. Therefore, the Court will entertain argument
from the parties as to the necessity of further discovery at the
same time as the oral argument on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider. After the hearing, the Court will clarify the prospective application of the October 17, 2006 order.
Dated this

day of

2006.

N R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
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ATTORNEY PLA
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RAY HUNTING,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, LLC,
Defendant.

Civil No. 050800484
Judge: John R. Anderson

£/(«

{'[6^

Motion to strike and rescind order is granted based on Defendant's memorandum in
support and on clear language of Rule 7(b) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure..

is
Dated this

<\h

day of

qdf,

, 2006.

Honorable John R. Anderson
District Court Judge
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LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP W. DYER
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315)
CAREY A. SEAGER (9463)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
221 Keams Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 363-5000
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RAY HUNTING,

;)
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF RESTrf UTION

;

VS.

PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, LLC, a Utah
Limited Liability Company
Defendant.

;
])

Case No. 050800484

;)

Judge John R. Anderson

TO THE DEFENDANT: PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, LLC
QjfrJ

ATTN: WILLIAM LAUF, Registered Agent

Within feg€H^-) business days following service of a copy of this Order of Restitution,
the Defendant must vacate the premises located at 5500 East 5750 South, Vernal, Utah 84079,
remove the Defendant's personal property, and restore possession of the premises to the Plaintiff,
or be forcibly removed by a sheriff or constable. Furthermore, the Defendant has the right to a
hearing to contest the manner of the enforcement of the Order of Restitution. A form for
requesting a hearing, together with a copy of this Order of Restitution, is served upon the

Defendant in accordance with Utah Code Annotated 78-36-6 (1997).
If the Defendant fails to comply with the Order of Restitution, the sheriff or constable
may, at the direction of the Plaintiff, enter the premises by force using the least destructive means
possible to remove the Defendant, the Defendant's personal property, and any other
person(s)/entity(ies) claiming a right to occupancy through the Defendant.
TO THE SHERIFF OR CONSTABLE:
If the Defendant, after being served with a copy of the Order of Restitution m accordance
with Utah Code Annotated 78-36-10.5(2)(a) (2003) fails to comply with the foregoing Order of
Restitution within three (3) days after service, you are commanded to, at the Plaintiffs direction,
enter the premises by force using the least destructive means possible to remove the Defendant,
any personal property of the Defendant, and any other person(s)/entity(ies) claiming a right to
occupancy through the Defendant.
DATED this 1 ^ day of

^Jt &

jT\

2006.

IONORABLE JOHN R. ANDERSON
District Court Judge

E \Cbent\Huntmg\Order of Restitution
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Exhibit L

RAY HUNTING,
RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs .
Case No. 050800484
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, LLC, a
limited liability company,

Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on the following motions:
1) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 22, 2006,
and accompanied by supporting memorandum and affidavit. Defendant's
opposition was filed October 10, 2006. Plaintiff's reply was filed
October 19, 2006. Notice to submit the motion for decision was filed
October 20, 2006.
2) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P.,
filed September 25, 2006, and accompanied by supporting memorandum.
Plaintiff's opposition was filed October 10, 2006. Defendant's reply
was filed October 19, 2006. Notice to submit the motion for decision
was filed October 30, 2006.
The Court has reviewed the motions and their respective
memoranda. Having considered the matter, and having received notice
to submit the motions for decision, the Court now rules upon the
motions.
For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the
Plaintiff's motion, but will reserve the issue of damages pending a
hearing on that issue. The Defendant's motion will be denied.
I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in relevant part, state, ". .
. [w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by
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affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah
R. Civ. P. Rule 56(e). The Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
was accompanied by affidavit and deposition citations setting forward
specific facts upon which the Court could find summary judgment
appropriate. The Defendant has not responded by affidavit or
established specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. Rather, it appears to the Court that the Defendant has based
its entire defense on a lease agreement entered into by the Plaintiff
and a non-party entity, Pipe Renewal Service, Inc. Where a party
fails to set forth facts showing a genuine issue of material fact,
"Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party
failing to file such a response." Td. Therefore, the Court's
attention turns to whether summary judgment is appropriate.
As pointed out by the Plaintiff in his reply memorandum in
support of the motion for summary judgment, the Defendant has not
disputed that the Plaintiff served the Defendant both 1) a notice of
rent increase and 2) a notice to vacate after the Defendant had failed
to pay the increased amount of rent. Rather, the Defendant argues
that notices were received, but that such notice constitutes a breach
of the lease agreement between the Plaintiff and Pipe Renewal Service,
Inc., a non-party to this lawsuit. The Defendant has not offered any
evidence to support the fact that the Defendant, Pipe Renewal Service,
LLC, is bound by the terms of that lease agreement or that the
Plaintiff is obligated to deal with Pipe Renewal Service, LLC, in the
same way that the Plaintiff is required to deal with Pipe Renewal
Service, Inc. The Court, having reviewed the record, is of the
opinion that the lease agreement, as it has been submitted in regard
to the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, is irrelevant. The
Defendant is not party to that contract and the Plaintiff is not
obligated to deal with the Defendant based upon the terms expressed
therein. Without the lease agreement argument to fall back on, the
Defendant has done nothing to contest the Plaintiff's right to summary
judgment or to create a genuine issue of material fact.
The Court is convinced by the argument and the citations to Utah
law that the Plaintiff is entitled to unilaterally raise rents when
the landlord and tenant have failed to memorialize the lease in
writing. In such an instance, the lease is month-to-month. If the
Defendant was concerned about a unilateral rent increase, the
Defendant could have negotiated with the Plaintiff and sought to
reduce the lease agreement to writing. The Court has not been
presented with any evidence indicating that the Plaintiff is not
legally entitled to unilaterally increase rent in this case. Because
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the Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to increase rent, and
because the Defendant concedes receiving notice of the rent increase
and failing to pay the increased amount, and because the Plaintiff
served the Defendant with a notice to vacate, and because the
Defendant did not pay the increased rent and did not vacate, the Court
can lawfully conclude that the Defendant is in unlawful detainer of
the subject property. Therefore, the Court will grant the Plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment. However, the Court is concerned with the
amount of damages as calculated by the Plaintiff. Therefore, the
Court will order that a hearing be held on the issue of damages.
II.

THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

By granting the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the
Court has implicitly denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss. The
Plaintiff and the Defendant correctly point out that "If, on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 12(c). Here, the Court will exclude the lease
agreement, and will treat the motion as a motion to dismiss. The
Court finds that the Plaintiff has not failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Even if the Court were not to exclude
the lease agreement, the Court would find the lease agreement to be
irrelevant as to the parties to this suit. Therefore, whether the
motion is treated as a motion to dismiss or as a motion for summary
judgment, the Defendant's argument ultimately fails. Simply put, the
Plaintiff has not failed to state a claim and nothing in the record
creates a genuine issue of material fact.
ORDER
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, the
Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED, and the matter will be set
for hearing on the issue of damages.
Dated this

/ > f day of "71 dU*

f \

, 200<£\

•HN R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge
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Exhibit M

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF' UTAH

RAY HUNTING,
RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, LLC, a
limited liability company,

CASE NO. 050800484
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel Discovery and to Conduct Limited Discovery, filed September 15, 2006, and accompanied by supporting memorandum and affidavit. The Defendant has failed to respond to the motion within
the timeframe established by Rule 7(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Having reviewed the matter, and having received a notice to submit the motion for decision, the Court now
rules upon the motion. For the reasons that follow, the Court
will grant the motion.
First, the Defendant has failed to respond to the motion.
For this reason alone, the Court is inclined to grant the motion. Further, a review of the deposition transcript reveals
that the Defendant did agree to provide the requested materials
at the July 31, 2006 deposition of Mr. Lauf. It appears to the
Court that the Plaintiff has made reasonable efforts to contact
the Defendant and request the agreed upon materials. The Court
finds that the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is proper under the
circumstances and will grant the motion.
//

**>nll

ORDER
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that the Plaintiffs motion is GRANTED. The Defendant is ordered to produce the materials as outlined in the Plaintiff's
memorandum in support of the motion (PL's Mem. of P. & A. in
Supp. of P L ' s Mot. 5 ) . The Court also orders a limited extension of time for the deposition of Boyce Coombs, Boyce Coombs,
P.C., and Defendant's tax attorney. The parties are instructed
to submit a Proposed Second Amended Scheduling Order with revised dates for the Court's signature. Finally, the Court orders that the Defendant pay the Plaintiff's fees and costs incurred in bringing the motion to compel. The Plaintiff is instructed to submit a proposed order on fees and costs to the Defendant. The Defendant will have 30 days to request a hearing,
if desired, on that proposed order.
Dated this

it

day of

2006.

JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Not Reported in P.3d
Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33249409 (Utah App.),
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33249409)
Pinckney v. Snideman
Utah App.,2000.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Joy PINCKNEY, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
John David SNIDEMAN, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 990944-CA.
Oct. 5, 2000.
Richard L. Tretheway, Springville, for appellant.
Thomas J. Klc, Salt Lake City, for appellee.
Before GREENWOOD, DAVIS, and THORNE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION)
DAVIS.
*1 Pinckney appeals both the trial court's ruling
that Snideman was not the real party in interest and
the trial court's award of attorney fees to Snideman.
We reverse and remand for a new trial on Pinckney's claim for unlawful detainer.
Pinckney brought an unlawful detainer action as assignee of the beneficial interest under a trust deed
executed by Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. (Prodigy) as
trustor. In the event of default by Prodigy, the trust
deed provided that the beneficiary could take possession of the property and sue for rents, issues, and
profits.
Pinckney argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Snideman was not a proper party in the
unlawful detainer action. The trial court's interpretation of the statute defining unlawful detainer is a
question of law which we review for correctness.
See Cache County v. Bern, 1999 UT App 134, % 8,
978P.2d 1043.

© 2008 Thomson/West. No

Page 1
UT App 275

"A tenant of real property, for a term less than life,
is guilty of an unlawful detainer ... when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after
default in the payment of any rent...."Utah Code
Ann. §78-36-3(l)(1999).
"Unlawful detainer, however, is an action to remove a tenant from possession and is primarily
against the person in possession. It is not similar to
a quiet title action wherein anyone with any interest
should be joined. Neither is it similar to an action
upon the promissory note."Pearce v. Shurtz, 2 Utah
2d 124, 270 P.2d 442,443 (1954). Furthermore,
[n]o person other than the tenant of the premises ...
shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding
... nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff
be nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who
might have been made a party defendant; but when
it appears that any of the parties served with process or appearing in the proceedings are guilty,
judgment shall be rendered against those parties.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7(1) (1999).
Pinckney filed his complaint of unlawful detainer
against Snideman because Snideman was in possession of the property.FN1 Therefore, we reverse the
judgment of the trial court because Snideman was a
real party in interest and an appropriate defendant
in the unlawful detainer proceeding.
FN1. Snideman testified that the property
in question was his personal address and
that he was living at that address. The trial
court made no finding relative to the circumstances under which Snideman possessed the property.
Pinckney also argues that the trial court erred in
awarding attorney fees to Snideman because there
was no contract between Pinckney and Snideman
providing for the award of attorney fees.
"[W]hether attorney fees are recoverable in an ac-

to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Not Reported in P.3d
Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33249409 (Utah App.), 2000 UT App 275
(Cite as: Not Reported in P3d, 2000 WL 33249409)
tion is a question of law, which we review for correctness." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315
(Utah 1998). Generally, kt[i]n Utah, attorney fees
are awardable only if authorized by statute or by
contract."D/x/e State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d
985, 988 (Utah 1988).
The trial court awarded Snideman attorney fees
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (1999)
based upon the attorney fees provision in the trust
deed and trust deed note. Section 78-27-56.5
provides:
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the preservation of Pinckney's claims, the
exclusion of evidence, Pinckney's marshaling burden, and Snideman's request for
damages on appeal.
GREENWOOD, P.J., and THORNE, J., concur.
Utah App.,2000.
Pinckney v. Snideman
Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33249409 (Utah
App.), 2000 UT App 275
END OF DOCUMENT

*2 A court may award costs and attorney's fees to
either party that prevails in a civil action based
upon any promissory note, written contract, or other
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the
provisions of the promissory note, written contract,
or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorney's fees.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (1999).
Here, there was no promissory note, written contract, or any other writing between Snideman and
Pinckney. The note and trust deed were between
Pinckney and Prodigy, the court made no finding
relative to a lease or agreement between defendant
and Prodigy providing for attorney fees, see id. §
78-36-10(3) (1999), and Pickney made no claim for
fees under the trust or note. Therefore, the trial
court erred in awarding attorney fees under the reciprocal provisions of section 78-27-56.5. Furthermore, in light of our ruling, Snideman is no longer
a prevailing party, and thus, he is not entitled to attorney fees under section 78-27-56.5.
Thus, we reverse the trial court's ruling that
Snideman was not the real party in interest, we reverse the court's award of attorney fees, and we remand for a new trial on Pinckney's claim of unlawful detainer.™2
FN2. In light of our ruling, we do not address the issues raised by Snideman concerning the inadequacy of Pinckney's brief,
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